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The Board of Tax Appeals and Net Income
By James L. Dohr
Ever since the passage of the first income-tax law requiring a
determination of net income for the purpose of computing tax
liability, tax administrators, accountants and lawyers have di
rected their efforts to the solution of the many problems of netincome determination. To the accountant the problems were by
no means novel; the preparation of profit-and-loss statements and
the determination of net profits had long given rise to similar
questions. The experience gained in the accounting field and the
principles and procedure developed therein are given a measure
of recognition in the federal income-tax law which provides in
general that taxable net income shall be computed in accordance
with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the
books of the taxpayer—so long as such
come” (revenue acts of 1924 and 1926, section 212-b), and in
the regulations issued thereunder which provide that “approved
standard methods of accounting will ordinarily be regarded as
clearly reflecting income” (Regulations 65, article 23). Nor
can it be said that the problems of income determination were en
tirely new to the lawyer, though frankness compels the admission
that many of the legal efforts devoted to its solution have left much
to be desired.
Experience under the various federal revenue acts in the deter
mination of net income has never been entirely satisfactory from
the accounting point of view. In the center of a comparatively
new and decidedly optimistic business field, the philosophy of the
American accountant has been developed along the lines of a care
ful conservatism not always in harmony with the law and regula
tions affecting net income. A typical accounting definition of the
term indicates this backward leaning. “The net income of a
business is the surplus remaining from the earnings after pro
viding for all costs, expenses and reserves for accrued or probable
losses” (Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice, page 308).
When such a definition is applied and careful provision is made for
all “accrued or probable losses,” a result is obtained which tends
toward the understatement of net income rather than toward an
inflated or optimistic presentation. The succinct definition of
427
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income laid down by the supreme court can scarcely be used as a
working standard. “ Income may be defined as the gain derived
from capital, from labor or from both combined, provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets” (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 United States 189).
To say that income is a gain or a profit gained is to say nothing.
Further than this, the supreme court in interpreting the word
“income” as used in the constitutional amendment seems, curi
ously enough, to have regarded the word as the substantial equiv
alent of what the accountant calls gross income rather than net,
and congress is permitted to levy a tax on an artificial net income
in which no deduction is permitted for certain necessary expenses.
No accountant, for instance, would compute net income from a
mine without making allowance for depletion, yet so far as the
supreme court is concerned such expense may be denied as a de
duction without offending the constitutional limitation (Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 United States 103). The result is
clearly a tax on capital rather than on income. More effective,
by far, is an effort toward definition such as that of Professor
Robert Murray Haig: “Income is the money value of the net
accretion to one’s economic power between two points of time”
(The Federal Income Tax, Columbia University Press, 1921).
Economic power may be of a somewhat doubtful quantity, but
substitute the term “economic wealth ” and the accountant should
recognize one of his own methods of net-profit determination, that
of a comparison of balance-sheets. Further than this, however,
the definition requires modification to permit recognition of the
concept of realized income since increases in economic wealth
may not, as in the case of appreciation in land value, give rise to
realized income. This modification is extremely important since
the income tax is in essence an attempt to reach ability to pay,
which can only be properly measured by realized income. When
net income is used as a basis for taxation, its determination in
volves the dual problem of establishing (a) what is income in a
given situation, and (b) whether or not the income is realized by
the taxpayer in the sense that he has received sufficient gain
properly to pay the tax.
It is submitted, however, that the accountant’s basic difficulty
arises from a failure to recognize that there is, as a matter of law, a
distinction between net profits and net income for tax purposes.
Net income is a statutory concept, and once this fact is recognized
428
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many rulings otherwise objectionable can be approved as being
correct—at least under the taxing statute. Any objections to the
concept should then of course be made to congress rather than to
the administrators of the law. On the other hand, the lawyer
has been prone to regard the term “net income” as an artificial
concept, ignoring the explicit direction of the statute that net
income be computed “in accordance with the method of account
ing regularly employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer,” so
long as such method “clearly reflects the income.”
After a long process of experimentation, congress, in the revenue
act of 1924, created the board of tax appeals as a part of the
federal tax collecting and administering plan. When the com
missioner of internal revenue has finally determined that
additional taxes are due from a taxpayer, the latter may take an
appeal to the board. When the appeal is heard the taxpayer ob
tains, under proper pleadings, a de novo consideration of his
return for the year involved, and the board decides whether the pro
posed deficiency shall be disallowed or allowed in whole or in part.
In this situation the board has rendered numerous decisions, some
of which are of considerable interest with relation to the problem
under consideration, namely, the determination of net income.
It is proposed to show by a review of these decisions that the
board, while realizing clearly that it is dealing with a statutory
concept, is disposed carefully to consider correct and approved
accounting principles but has not as yet given these principles
the full measure of recognition they deserve.
The board recognized from the start the proposition that
income in general may be determined upon the so-called cash or
accrual bases, and that the inclusion of items of gross income and
the taking of deductions therefrom must be determined in the
light of the method, cash or accrual, adopted by the taxpayer
(appeal of Henry Reubel, 1 B. T. A. 676). When the taxpayer
has reported on either of the bases allowed, the decision as to what
amounts may be included in gross income or what amounts are
deductible therefrom should be made with due regard to the
underlying accounting principles involved. For instance, where
the taxpayer reports on the cash basis, it is obviously improper to
allow a deduction as a bad debt for interest accrued which has
not at any time been reported as income (appeal of Charles A.
Collins, 1 B. T. A. 305). Bad debts must be charged off in order
to be deductible, and, as the board pointed out, what is charged
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off must first be “charged on”. On the cash basis no “charge
on” is made for interest accruals.
Of course, strictly speaking, there are no accounting principles
underlying the cash basis. No accountant would think of pre
paring a profit-and-loss statement on the cash basis and the
phrase “income on the cash basis” is in itself a contradiction of
terms, since even under that method of income determination a
measure of accrual is required in the recognition of inventories,
capital expenditures, accounts receivable for sales, accounts pay
able for purchases and depreciation. Where merchandise is an
income-producing factor the only difference between the cash and
accrual bases lies in the consideration of accounts receivable and
payable at the opening and closing dates for other than merchan
dise sales or purchases. Only the necessities of the situation re
quire a recognition of the fact that the so-called cash basis is
actually used as a method of accounting.
While no quarrel may be had with the board on its general re
quirement of consistency in the method of accounting adopted, it is
by no means clear that the taxpayer is limited to a choice of either
the cash or the accrual basis. The board’s decisions were made
largely under the revenue act of 1918, but viewing the situation as
it exists under later revenue acts as well, it would seem that other
methods of reporting might be adopted. Consider the following
statutory directions (the italics are ours):

(a) The net income shall be computed ... in accordance
with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the
books of the taxpayer (section 212 (b), revenue act of 1926).
(b) Unless the method so employed does not clearly reflect the
income (same section).
(c) The terms “paid or accrued” and “paid or incurred”
shall be construed according to the method of accounting employed
in determining net income, and
(d) The deductions shall be taken in the year in which paid or
accrued, or paid or incurred, dependent upon the method of ac
counting used in determining net income, unless in order to clearly
reflect the income such deductions should be taken as of a different
period (section 200 (d), revenue act of 1926).
(e) Items of gross income shall be reported when received
unless under the methods of accounting permitted such items areprop430
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perly accounted for in a different period (section 213 (a), revenue act
of 1926).
These provisions indicate only two limitations upon the method
of net-income determination. The accounting method used on
the books must be followed so long as it clearly reflects income.
The statute permits not only the cash or accrual bases, but any
accounting method which clearly reflects income. It is submit
ted that the commissioner of internal revenue, in prescribing two
methods for the reporting of income on long-term contracts has
correctly permitted as a third method any accounting method
which clearly reflects the income (article 36 of Regulations 62).
A review of the decisions to date shows strikingly that the
board has made commendable efforts to determine what are the
recognized principles of accounting, and has not hesitated to
overrule the commissioner of internal revenue when accounting
principles were ignored. Thus, in the appeal of the GoodellPratt Co. (3 B. T. A. 30, Nov. 14, 1925), the board held that
expenditures for developing patents, etc., which had been charged
to expense in prior years by the taxpayer should have been capi
talized, and that such expenditure should be restored to surplus
account. The commissioner of internal revenue had held that
such expenditures fell in a class where the taxpayer had an option
to charge to expense or to capitalize, and that once charged either
way the option was exercised and became binding. The board
said, after reviewing the legal and accounting authorities, that
the expenditures were clearly capital; that accounting principles
did not permit an option as between two diametrically opposed
methods of treatment, and that the expenditures heretofore
erroneously charged to expense should be restored to the surplus
account. The decision is typical of many efforts made by the
board to recognize sound accounting principles.
In other cases, however, accounting principles have not fared so
well at the hands of the board. In the case of a paving contrac
tor who received full payment in the year in which a contract was
performed, the entire amount received was held to be taxable al
though the contractor had agreed to keep the paving in repair for
a period of years (Uvalde Co.’s appeal, 1 B. T. A. 932). The
taxpayer attempted to reserve a part of the income to take care of
the expenditures for repairs. No accountant, of course, would
consider any proposition other than just such a reservation before
stating the net income from the contract. As a practical matter,
431
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however, the accountant would take care of the situation some
what as follows:
Gross income from contract...................................................
Cost of performance................................................................
Reserved for repairs................................................................

$100,000
$50,000
5,000
-- --------

Net income.......................................................................

55,000
$45,000

Handling the situation in this way indicates that the item
“Reserved for repairs” is a deduction similar to expenses of per
formance. If the accountant were discriminating he would por
tray the situation as follows:
Gross income from contract (less unearned portion of $5,000)........
Expenses of performance........................................................................

$95,000
50,000

Net income.......................................................................................

$45,000

The board treated the estimated cost for maintenance as in the
nature of an expense or expenditure, and since it could not be said
to have been paid or incurred in the taxable year no deduction
could be allowed. What the board failed to see was that the ques
tion was in no sense one of deductibility but rather a question of
determining how much of the money received was income. Money
received in circumstances imposing upon the recipient a liability to
perform certain acts is not income so long as the liability exists.
The money is not earned until the services are performed.
If the board were correct in supposing that the reservation for
repairs involved a deduction the decision would be sound as a
matter of law. As indicated above, the supreme court, in defining
income as used in the constitutional amendment, has consistently
made a curious distinction between gains, or credits to profit-andloss account, and losses, or debits to that account. The amend
ment covers gains or credits only, and congress may apparently do
as it pleases in the matter of allowing deductions. Congress may
tax a net income without allowing a deduction for depletion (Von
Baumbach, collector v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503) or it may
allow depletion as a deduction only up to 5 per cent, of the gross
value of the output at the mine (Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240
U. S. 103). Following this idea the circuit court of appeals, third
circuit, said in Ludington v. McCaughn (1 Fed. 689):
“Taxable gain is a constitutional concept denoting income which the
taxpayer has derived, while deductible loss is a creation of congress, vary
ing from time to time, as congress deals with it in various ways.”
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The board, of course, must follow this distinction as a matter of
law even though every accountant might disagree with it. To
the accountant income is a matter of both gross income and de
ductions. The board, however, was not obliged to use this judi
cial interpretation in a situation where it was not applicable.
Where the taxpayer makes payment in cash for benefits to be
obtained in future years he is not allowed to deduct such payment
at the time made. In Allard & Bro.’s appeal (1 B. T. A. 631), the
taxpayer in 1921 paid his rent in advance for 1922 to 1925. His
returns were made on a cash basis. The board said that no de
duction should be permitted in 1921 because the payment, as far
as that year was concerned, was a capital item. The accountant
would, of course, agree but he would also insist that the lessor had
no income by virtue of the payment, and that the situation of the
lessor and that of the paving contractor were identical. The
accountant can not consider any money received as income so long
as there is a fair probability that further expense must be incurred.
This possibility is taken care of by a reservation which, carefully
considered, is the segregation of a part of the receipts, and the ex
clusion of that part from the profit-and-loss account. The board,
treating such reservations as claims for deductions, naturally
finds no authority therefor.
In another group of cases the board has passed upon the ques
tion as to when, upon the accrual basis, a given item of expense
becomes deductible. The decisions are somewhat narrow and
overly legalistic, in that generally no deduction is allowed until a
legal liability has been incurred. A typical decision along this
line is that of the appeal of the Guarantee Construction Co.
(2 B. T. A. 1145), holding that the federal income tax, under the
revenue act of 1918, accrues on March 15th of the following year,
when due and payable, and may not be set up as a liability on
December 31st of the year to which it is applicable. Accounting
principles require a broader viewpoint. While there will always
be some doubt as to how far accruals should be made, the account
ant goes beyond legal liabilities and accrues all probable expenses
or costs. The accountant on December 31st requires:
(1) A showing of all legal liabilities due and payable.
(2) A showing of all legal liabilities though payable at a future
date.
(3) A reservation for expenses and losses applicable to the past
period which will probably be incurred or experienced. For in
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stance, if the company is legally bound to pay a pension on disabil
ity of a workman, provision is made in advance for such liability
by charging the periods in which the workman performs services.
While the wording of the statute will not permit a full recogni
tion of the accounting principles involved it is contended that a
broader viewpoint could be adopted by the board. The owner of
accounts receivable who is bound to allow a discount if a debtor
makes payment within a certain time should be allowed a deduc
tion in advance where experience shows that a large percentage of
customers will probably take advantage of the discount.
A serious doubt has been cast on the correctness of the board’s
decision in this type of case by the recent supreme court decision
of United States v. The Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (decided January
4, 1926). In this case the Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. was, during
the year 1916, engaged in the manufacture of munitions. The
munitions tax for that year became due and was paid in 1917.
The revenue act of 1916 permits a deduction for taxes paid, and
the company contended that inasmuch as the munitions tax was
not paid during the year and did not become due and payable until
1917, it should be deducted in 1917. The returns were made on
the accrual basis, and it was argued that the tax did not accrue
until due and payable. The supreme court rejected this legal
istic argument and held the tax a deduction in 1916. The court
said that the provisions of the statute permitting the returns to be
made on the basis on which the books were kept, so long as such
basis clearly reflected income, were intended
“. . . to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their returns
according to scientific accounting principles by charging against income
earned during the taxable period, the expenses incurred in and properly
attributable to the process of earning income during that period; . . . "

The court said further:
“The appellee’s true income for the year 1916 could not have been
determined without deducting from its gross income for the year the total
cost and expenses attributable to the production of that income during the
year. The reserve for munitions taxes set up on its books for 1916 must
have been deducted from receivables for munitions sold in that year before
the net results of the operations for the year could be ascertained.”

The narrow and legalistic view that accruals are permissible
only when the items of expense become due and payable was
definitely rejected in the following passage:
“ In a technical legal sense, it may be argued that a tax does not accrue
until it has been assessed and becomes due; but it is also true that in ad-
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vance of the assessment of a tax, all the events may occur which fix the
amount of the tax and determine the liability to pay it. In this respect,
for purposes of accounting and of ascertaining true income for a given
accounting period, the munitions tax here in question did not stand on any
different footing than other accrued expenses appearing on appellee’s
books. In the economic and bookkeeping sense with which the statute and
treasury decision are concerned, the taxes had accrued.”

The reasoning of the Guarantee appeal was applied consistently
in the appeal of L. S. Ayers & Co. (1 B. T. A. 1135). It was there
held that in determining invested capital the surplus at the begin
ning of the year need not be reduced by dividends paid during the
year (outside of dividends paid within the first sixty days) so long
as the year’s earnings up to the dividend date, without deducting
therefrom any portion of the year’s income and profits taxes, were
large enough to take care of the dividend. Thus, in determining
the amount available for payment of a dividend on April 1, 1918,
no deduction need be taken from the earnings from January 1,
1918, to April 1, 1918, for the 1918 tax due and payable in 1919.
This decision is entirely consistent with the Guarantee Construc
tion Co. appeal, but like that appeal it is seriously questionable
under the decision in the Yale and Towne case. The board of
tax appeals says, in effect, that the tax for 1918 accrues on March
15,1919, whereas the supreme court says it accrues in 1918. The
question now remains as to what the supreme court would do in
the situation presented by the L. S. Ayres appeal.
The court of claims recently had occasion to answer this ques
tion in the case of D’Olier, et al. v. United States, decided March 15,
1926, and it was held that the earnings available to pay a dividend
in any year must be reduced by the proportionate part of the
year’s taxes. The court seemed to consider the question as an
swered by the Yale and Towne case, and interpreted that case as
holding that the taxes accrued during the year rather than on
March 15th of the succeeding year, thus arriving at an opinion
contrary to that of the board of tax appeals. It is submitted in
this relation that the court of claims has overlooked an alternative
interpretation of the Yale and Towne case, namely, that the tax in
question accrues, not on March 15th of the succeeding year, nor
during the year, but rather at December 31st of the year in ques
tion. It is only on December 31st of any year that it becomes
certain that a tax will have to be paid, since prior to that time a
profit may be changed to a loss by subsequent events. On this
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basis, the L. S. Ayres case may be approved and reconciled to the
Yale and Towne case.
Since the time of these decisions the revenue act of 1926 has
been passed with a clause apparently nullifying the effect of the
Guarantee Construction Co. case. This section appears as
follows:
“Sec. 1207. The computation of invested capital for any taxable year
under the revenue act of 1917, the revenue act of 1918, and the revenue
act of 1921, shall be considered as having been correctly made, so far as
relating to the inclusion in invested capital for such year of income, war
profits, or excess-profits taxes for the preceding year, if made in accordance
with the regulations in force in respect of such taxable year applicable to
the relationship between invested capital of one year and taxes for the
preceding year.”

The regulations referred to required a deduction from surplus
as of the beginning of the year for the instalments of income and
profits taxes paid, but only from the date of each instalment
(article 845 of Regulations 45 and article 845 of Regulations 62;
see appeal of Russel Wheel and Foundry Co., docket 2029, de
cided April 3, 1926).
The board’s theory of accruals is again of somewhat doubtful
and inconsistent character with relation to deductions for offic
ers’ salaries. It is frequently desired to compensate officers in
proportion to the results they obtain in the way of profits. As a
practical matter, such profits are usually not ascertainable until
after the close of the year. Of course, if an officer has an agree
ment whereby he is to receive a certain percentage of profits, a
legal liability exists on the closing day of the year, and no one
would dispute the deductibility of such bonus. Wherever the
board can find a legal obligation to pay arising within the taxable
year, the deduction is allowed even though the amount is deter
mined and entered after the close of the year (appeal of Reub
Isaacs and Co., 1 B. T. A. 45). Where no such legal obligation
can be found the deduction is not allowed (Jamestown Worsted
Mills appeal, 1 B. T. A. 659).
It is submitted that the determination of income depends upon
no such requirements of a legal obligation, and that there is ample
warrant in the statute for deductions when no legal liability exists.
Suppose that officers’ salaries (in excess of a normal amount) are
determined after the close of the taxable year, without prior agree
ment, on the basis of profit as shown by the books, and that the
amounts so determined are reasonable compensation for the
436
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services rendered.
a series of years:

The following might be a typical situation for
1917

Net income before extra compensa
tion....................................................
Additional compensation determined
without prior agreement................

1918

1919

1920

$100,000 $250,000 $640,000 $20,000
40,000

100,000

250,000 None

According to the board’s decisions the net income would be de
termined as follows:

1917...........................................................
1918...........................................................
1919 ...........................................................
1920...........................................................

Net before
Bonus
Taxable
bonus
deduction
income
$100,000
None
$100,000
250,000
$40,000
210,000
640,000
100,000
540,000
20,000
250,000 Loss— 230,000

Obviously such a method results in a ridiculous statement of in
come, and if ever there was a situation in which the statutory
mandate of clearly reflecting the income should be brought into
play, this is it. The bonus of $250,000 was intended to be paid
from the profits of the year 1919 and should be deducted there
from. In other words, quite apart from any requisite of a legal
obligation, reference should be had to the period to which the ex
penditure relates and the period which received the benefit of the
services for which the payment compensates. According to the
Yale and Towne case, the earnings of the period are to be reduced
by expenses properly attributable to the process of earning income
during the period.
In the matter of inventories, the board has expressed itself as
regarding consistency in inventory practice of greater moment
than the methods of inclusion and valuation with relation to a
specific inventory (Buss Co.’s appeal, 2 B. T. A. 266). In this
position the board has correctly determined the accounting sig
nificance of the inventory, namely, the correct allocation of in
come to the various accounting periods. If the tax rates were the
same from year to year, there would usually be no difference in the
tax payable, whatever the inventories used, since the closing in
ventory of one year (a credit to profit-and-loss account) becomes
the opening inventory of the next year, and a debit to profit-andloss account. In determining the valuation of inventory items
under the rule of cost or market, whichever is lower, the board
437

The Journal of Accountancy
has failed to apprehend the accounting problem involved. Every
accountant realizes that both market and cost, particularly in
the case of goods in process and finished goods, is a matter of es
timate. This is equally true of goods which are damaged,
deteriorated or obsolete. In many cases proper valuation can be
arrived at only by a process of estimating and adding or deducting
percentage allowances for various items. In other words, there
are no such things as absolute true inventories as required by the
board. An intelligent attempt to approximate proper valua
tions by percentage allowances should be permitted though the
board hold otherwise (Kleeman Dry Goods Co.’s appeal, 2 B. T.
A. 369). The board’s difficulty here seems to arise from a failure
to recognize that inventory valuation is at best a matter of
judgment and approximation.
In the matter of the general rule for the inclusion of items in the
inventory, the board has accepted the title basis established by
the commissioner’s regulations (article 1611, Regulations 62).
That is, where a taxpayer has made purchase commitments, and
on the closing day of the taxable year finds that the market has
declined he is unable to take the loss because he does not have title
to the merchandise in question (appeal of Haas Bros., 3 B. T. A.
113). It is difficult to see the precise difference between a tax
payer who has acquired title to merchandise and his fellow tax
payer who is under a contractual obligation to take merchandise
where the market has declined. The mere fact that one taxpayer
has acquired possession and title would not seem to give him a loss
any more than if he had merely a contractual liability to take
goods where the market has declined. From the accounting point
of view, such a loss is realized and could easily be included in the
income-tax return under a modification of the title rule. In this
relation it may be pointed out that as a matter of practical con
venience the test of possession would be far preferable to that of
title. The determination of title often involves numerous com
plications, whereas possession may easily be determined by any
one (section 100, New York personal property law). As a matter
of fact, the title basis can be justified only on the ground that risk
of loss, with one or two exceptions, follows title (section 103,
same). The proper basis for inventory inclusion, in theory
at least, would seem to be that which gives proper effect to
risk of loss, including in such risk the risk of decline in market
value.
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It was in a series of decisions relating to the so-called instal
ment method of reporting income from sales of personal property
and real estate that the board arrived at one of its most startling
conclusions. After recognizing this method of accounting in an
early case (Franc Furniture Co.’s appeal, 1 B. T. A. 420), the
board later held that the method was not warranted by the
revenue act of 1918 (appeal of B. M. Todd, 1 B. T. A. 762). In
spite of the emphasis placed in that act upon methods of account
ing which clearly reflect income, the board held that only two
methods were permissible, the cash or the accrual, and inasmuch
as the instalment-sales method was neither of the two it could not
be used. The decision was followed in the appeal of H. B.
Graves Co. (1 B. T. A. 859), and later in the appeal of the HooverBond Co. (1 B. T. A. 929), though not in the latter case without
a tremor of remorse for old article 42 of Regulations 45. In the
appeal of 650 West End Ave. Co. (2 B. T. A. 958), the same
bitter treatment was given the instalment method as applied to
realty sales.
It seems clear, as pointed out above, that the board is in error
in stating that only the cash or the accrual method is permissible in
the determination of net income. The act permits any method
of accounting which clearly reflects income. The board’s decision
can be accepted only as the basis of a holding that the instalmentsales method does not clearly reflect income. On this proposition
the accountant can not agree with the board. As to sales of per
sonalty, where the taxpayer’s business is made up largely of such
transactions, the accrual basis may be justly applied in the long
run by a liberal allowance for bad debts, based on the taxpayer’s
experience with instalment-sales agreements which are not car
ried out. This procedure is not free from difficulties, however,
and the board’s decision leaves us with the embarrassing question
as to how the income shall be determined. The basic theory of
income taxation lies in the concept of realized income, so that a
small payment on account for a sale to customers of generally
doubtful credit does not warrant the reporting of realized income
on the transaction. Furthermore, in the case of instalment sales,
and particularly sales of real estate, the alternative of the instal
ment-sales method may, as a matter of law, be the method where
by no profit is taxable until the amounts received exceed the cost
of the property sold, by forcing the courts to a strictly cash
method of income determination. In State ex rel. Waldheim & Co.,
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Inc., v. Wisconsin tax commission (204 N. W. 481), the court
followed the decision of the Todd case, but the dissenting opinion
indicates what some courts may decide, namely, that a promise to
pay can not give rise to taxable income.
Where a dealer sells a phonograph costing $50 for $100 in cash,
there can be no question that a profit of $50 is realized. If the
$100 is paid in any other way than in cash, the test of realized
income is the fair market value of the property received (section
202 (a) and (b), revenue act of 1918). Where the sale is made
upon a so-called open account the obligation of the buyer is
treated as the equivalent of cash, and where the credit of the
buyer is good, and a deduction is allowed in the form of a reserve
for bad debts, the profit may be regarded as realized. In the
instalment business, however, the credit of the buyer is often
questionable, and it is a matter of extreme doubt whether or not
his obligation should be treated as having a fair market value.
Approaching the problem from this angle, it may be that no profit
is realized until the instalment payments exceed the cost of $50.
The board’s decisions may result in ultimately giving the taxpayer
more than he would get if the instalment-sales method were
approved.
Following these decisions, the revenue act of 1926 was passed
with a provision designed to negative the effect of the board’s
decisions. Under section 212 of this act, the instalment dealer is
accorded the privilege of reporting his profit as cash is collected.
This method is made retroactive by section 1208, which provides
as follows:
“Section 1208. The provisions of subdivision (d) of section 212 shall
be retroactively applied in computing income under the provisions of the
revenue act of 1916, the revenue act of 1917, the revenue act of 1918, the
revenue act of 1921 or the revenue act of 1924, or any of such acts as
amended. Any tax that has been paid under such acts prior to the enact
ment of this act, if in excess of the tax imposed by such acts as retroactively
modified by this section, shall, subject to the statutory period of limitations
properly applicable thereto, be credited or refunded to the taxpayer as
provided in section 284.”

It seems rather regrettable that congress should be called upon
to legislate on the detailed procedure of computing income. If
the process continues, there will eventually be no need for regu
lations as such, since the revenue act will include sections covering
all details.
As indicated at the outset, this summary, while not exhaustive,
indicates a commendable effort on the part of the board to recog
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nize generally accepted accounting principles in the determination
of net income. Whatever one’s criticism of the decisions may be,
it is obvious that the accountant’s theories and practices are
being considered more carefully than ever before. No one
should hesitate to approve this tendency, since the accountant’s
conservatism lends itself peculiarly well to the measurement of
an equitable basis of taxation, namely, ability to pay as shown by
realized income. Questions of statutory construction will always
arise and must be dealt with fairly, but it requires no great amount
of optimism to predict that accounting principles will be given
more and more recognition in the administration of income tax
ation.
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